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GLENN T. BAIRD AND CLAUDE J. BURTEKSHAW' S BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE 
We, the minority of the Logan Municipal Council, respectfully 
request you, Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, hear 
our objections to the decision of the First District Court issued in its 
Declaratory Judgment of October 20, 19 77. 
We are two of five councilmen elected in Ncivember, 1975, as 
the first action of implementing a newly adopted form of government. 
According to our understanding, Logan City is a legal and political 
entity created by the State of Utah. This means that the city government 
performs its acts of electing officials, mc:king policies, and e:iforcing 
them by the authority of the State. It also means that city government 
is an integrated unit--a whole system. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J.IRGl: tv:Il\T 
PCIJ\T I. 
THI ORIG!.!'\ "~f TEI DISPUTI 
The newly adopted government was given by its adopted law six 
months to change from the comm1ssior. to the council-mayor brm of 
government. The transition formalities appeared to have been 
accomplished within the time limits and without difficulties. This 
seemed to have meant that the action agencies of the city were arrange: 
so that all policy implementations were directly the responsibility 
of the mayor. The mayor's office alone became accountable to the 
citizens of Logan for the executive functions of the government. See 
Sectic>ns 2-1-1 through 2-1-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City, 
a copy of which is attached hereto. This administrative organizational 
rearrangemer1t, however, left untouched most of the substantive 
policies and many of the intra- cLd interdepartmental practices develor' 
in the previous system. Much of the time would be needed to st\.:dy, 1: 
where necessary ar:d desirable, change the language of the ordincnces 
and the practice of the agencies to conform to the new system. Cnticc. 
to th;s study would be how the new system would relate to state laws; 
which of these laws, if any, were not applicable to the new form, and 
which ones were applicable but were to be applied in a different manne: 
At be· t, the transition, examining and rewriting existing ordir.onces, 
responding appropri:ttely to current business, end adjusting to new 
relationships, would take months if not years to accomplish and much 
µatiencrc, 
The transition process had hardly begun when it was interrupted 
and supi::rseded by a different issue, one that not only consumed much 
time, but disrupted procedures and er.1otiorcally divided the membersoi 
the council. This disruptive issue carr,e concurrent with the new oyste" 
The former government, the com mis s10n, in the closing days of itS 
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existence, finalized a transdct10:1 in which a depleted city gravel 
pit was traded for other propert1e s. The deal was consummated--the 
contract was signed. The commission, the personnel who made the 
deal, the old system, was gone. 
Three of the new council members opposed the transaction--they 
were determined to undo the deal. We, two councilmen, opposed their 
efforts. The mayor, too, who had been a member of the old system 
and a party to the transaction, was suspect for his support of the 
transaction. Our feelings as councilmen were not that the transaction 
was a good or bad one but that a decision had been finalized. If 
legal irregularities occurred justifying an attack, the court was the 
appropriate forum. Since the city had become legally obligated, it 
should not initiate legal action against itself. 
The three members, the majority of the council, however, felt that 
the city, regardless of which form of government existed at the time of 
the transaction, had made an uneconomical and possibly illegal deal, 
and that they, the elected officials, had an obligation to correct the 
mistake. It was the dispute about whether the council should settle 
this that the legal location of power issue between the council and mayor 
developed. The business of implementing the new system often took 
second place, and finally was indistinguishable psychologically and 
emotionally from the gravel pit one. The gravel pit issue, in our 
opinion, has not only distorted and disrupted the council in its transition 
cctivities, but is at the heart of the Declaratory Suit and thereby 
confuses the issues before the court. 
In our opinion, the First District Court had ample reason to have 
held that the issues in the suit were primarily political rather than 
judicial, and in so doing would have supported the position to leave to 
the city the business of finally defining and implementing the new form 
of government. Such a denial would have permitted the city to use its 
-3-
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legally prescribed procedures, those in the state law, its Organic 
Act, to implement and give subst<:mce to the new government. 
We respectfully ask the Supreme Court, therefore, to consider 
the following reasons for reversal of the first District Court decree. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DISTORTS THE DISTINGUISHING 
FEATURE or LOGAN CITY'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
The lower court distorted Logan City's form of government when it 
accepted, in the manner it did, the Declaratory Judgment Suit. The suit 
was initiated in Logan City Council by three councilmen in the name 
of the city as plaintiff with a policy instrument they called a resolution. 
The three members ordered the city to pay the attorney's fees. The 
resolution was used to avoid the mayor's veto and the needed vote of 
four councilmen to override it. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURE OF LOGAN CITY'S 
FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
By the acceptance of the council's initiated suit, the court ignored, 
and by its decision, destroyed the feature that made Logan's newly 
adopted form of government distinctive--worth the adopting effort. This 
distinguishing feature of the state statute, Logan's Organic Act, is the 
way it provided for effecting the city's governmental functions. Without 
this distinctive feature, there was no point in the state legislature 
providing the additional legislation. With this feature, Utah cities 
could exercise their "ndependence in choosing the means of developing 
and using their granted political power to provide the services and solve 
the social problems of their local citizenry. Why the state legislature 
provided this variation of governmental form is noted in the statute's 
introduction. 
-4-
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The increasing demands for services and growing citizen 
awareness and concern have strained tl-'1e ablity of Utah's 
local governments to respond effectively, determines that 
there is a need to provide optional forms of municipal 
government under which citizens may vote to organize to 
meet their needs and desires. (Section 10-3-1202, Utah Code 
Annotated.) 
Clearly enough the state legislature intended to create, by addition 
to the law, a unique functional arrangement. In the definition section 
of the State's Municipal Code, it anticipates this distinctive provision 
with a definition of the words, "governing body," which appear in the Code 
to identify the governmental process and the ultimate responsible authority 
of the various forms. It means, says the Cede (Section 10-1-104), 
"collectively the legislative body and the executive of any municipality." 
"Unless otherwise provided" the law continues, the "governing body" 
for first, second, and third class cities and towns is to be the commissions 
or councils. The Optional Forms Act, the one adopted by Logan, 
unambiguously provides the "otherwise." Tne "otherwise" separates the 
two functions and thereby creates the unique system. Note the language: 
The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form 
vests the government of a municipality which adopts this form 
in two separate, independent, and eoual branches of municipal 
government; the executive branch consisting of the mayor and 
the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative 
branch consisting of the council. (Section 10-3-1209, Utah 
Code Annotated.) 
The law prescribes the council's duties with these words: "The council 
shall pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal administration, 
and perform all duties that may be required of it by law." (Section 10-3-1210.) 
The "governing body" processes, acco:-ding to the definition cited 
above from the Code, include more than passing ordinances, appropriating 
funds, etc. It includes It.hat the mayor, the executive branch does. The 
Lie holder of that office shall, says the law, "Er.force the laws and 
ordinances, " "execute the policies adopted by the council. " (Section 10-3-1219.) 
-5-
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The two branches, in combination, form the political, legal entity, 
the "governing body." Their combined as s~c;r.r.cents make them a 
unit, each performing a separate function. L'le council is not 
the action part of the city; it is not the fro:-.t off,ce. The executive office 
is. The mayor, on the other hand, does not i::itiate policy or appropriate 
funds. The council does. The mayor administers what is finally 
determined by the "governing body" to be be city's policies and laws. 
Each become specialists in their assignmer:t--the council in creating 
policies for general application--the executive for the application of 
the general policies to particular situations. 
The process of determining policy and law is also prescribed by 
the state law and the process so provided identifies the legal, political 
responsibility of the two-branched system. The process requires that 
"every ordinance or tax levy passed by the council shall be presented 
to the mayor for his approval or disapprovcl." (Section 10-3-1214.) It 
further specified that a part of a policy so srnall as a single item of 
an appropriation, once perrritted adoptior. by c re solution, (Section 10-6-82 
may be vetoed by the mayor. Vetoed proposcls may be overridden by a 
two-thirds vote of the council. It is this p;ocedure for which there 
is no provision for exception that makes foe system distinctive. At 
least four elected officials create or approve every policy, 
Tn another section of the State Code, not the Optional Forms chapter, 
the ordinance-making process is descnbed in detail. To identify the 
requirements of the statute with the proceciures for all cities, the state leg· 
islature included this language: 
1'1 municipalities where the mayor may disapprove an ordinance 
passed by the legislative body, the oreinance must show that 
it was passed with the mayor's approve! or that if the mayor 
disapproved the ordinance, that it was ;;c.ssed over his disapproval. 
(Section 10 -3 - 70 4 (10), Utah Code An;,:o~c.1ed.) 
-6-
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In the same chapter of the State Code that provides for the procedure 
to adopt an ordinance, the Code also provides for resolutions. In 
Section 10-3-717, the law reads: 
... unless otherwise required by law, the 'governing body' 
(both branches),* may exercise all c.dministrative powers by 
resolution including but not limited to: (1) establishing water 
and sewer rates; (2) charges for garbage collection and fees charged 
for municipal services; (3) establishing personnel policies and 
guidelines; and (4) regulating the use and operation of municipal 
property. Punishment, fines, or forfeitures may not be imposed 
by resolution. 
It would be absurd to claim that these "administrative powers" were 
exclusively the duties of the mayor permitting that office alone the 
use of a re solution. 
Except for the one restriction, the "governing body" has wide latitude 
in its use of the resolution. Presumably, the use of a resolution is 
left to the discretion of the "governing body." (Both branches.) Perhaps 
by ordinance, the "governing body" could specify the uses of the 
resolution. 
To further clarify the procedure, the law states that the resolution 
passed by the "governing body •... shall be rn the form and contain 
sections substantially similar to that prescribed for ordinances." 
(Section 10-3-718, Utah Code Annotated.) Clearly, the resolution is 
not an instrument apart from the pre scribed policy-making procedures. 
Nowhere does the law provide that the resolution becomes an exclusive 
means for council action. The policies of the city, by whichever 
instrument, are to be determined by the vote of at least three councilmen 
and the mayor or at least four councilmen following a mayor's veto. This 
rrocedure is an unequivocal part of Loo an Citv' .s form of goverr.rnent. The 
jlCige had no legal basis to create a policy instrument which circumvents 
the procedure and destroys the form of the system. 
Much ado is made by the attorney for the plaintiffs about the meaning 
c:•d use uf the words, "governing body." It is not theory or pt.ilosophy 
JOtes cJnd pare11thesis are OUfS. 
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which insures the distinctive form of the new systerr,. It is the procedu~ 
that guarantees it. 
The lower court was being prejudicially selective in its choice 
of the state law when it concluded that the coun::il was the "governing 
body," and with that conclusion justified the circumvention of the 
procedure. The court's rationale for this conclusion was that the 
same language was used to describe the council's duties in the 1977 
legislation as in the 1975. What strange logic. The court's transmitting 
interpretation gave meaning to the 1975 Optional Forms statute from a 
law that applies only to commission and council forms of government. 
It then gave the same meaning to the amended 19 77 legislation by noting 
that the same language was used to state the council's duties. The 
statement of duties has nothing to do with the issue at hand. The 
court could have chosen a mo re relevant statute with common language 
and common history if that were the proper method of establishing validity-· 
and with relevancy to the issue. A 1959 act, for which the Optional 
Fonns Act in 1975 was substituted, uses the ider,tical language to assign 
the council its duties, and it leaves ii ttle ambiguitJ a bout the intention 
of the legislature to have the governing function shared. Note the 
language: 
The municipal government of all cities of the fHst and second 
class is vested in a mayor and a board of five commissioners 
to be elected at large. The mayor shall be the chief executive 
officer. (Section 10-6-7 8, Utah Code fa.n:iotated.) 
The Board of Commissioners (councU) in cities of the first and 
second class shall be legislative bodies of such cities and 
as such shalJ pass ordinances, appropriate funds, and review 
city administration and shall pe rforrn all duties that may be 
required of them by law. (Section 10-6-79, l,'tah Code Annotc:ted .) 
It is clear from the 1959 statute that the cour1cil (commission), was 
intended to have only the legislative function; in the 1975 act the phrase 
"governing body," only meant legislative function (Section 10-6-104(2), 
-8. 
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Utah Code Annotated); and in the 1977 c:ct the phrase "governing body" 
was given the inclusive meaning of both functions. The council's 
procedure and duties are provided with the same language in the three 
statutes, as is the mayor's. The uniqueness of the system is the 
sharing of the governing body function. 
The judge of the court performed a sleight-of-hand trick when he 
quoted the law creating two separate, independent, and equal brcnches, 
noted that the phrase, "governing body, " had been eliminated from 
the 1977 statute, and then with misdirected reverse logic announced 
that "in examining the specific areas of conflict, the council will be 
treated as the governing body." With this almost hidden conclusion, 
all the issues of the case were decided. The system had been distorted. 
The system that shared political power ceased to be two separate, 
independent, and equal branches. The court was deceived by its own legerdemain 
POINT IV. 
THE DISPUTANTS APE LEGISLATORS 
The District Court also erred in accepting the suit by failing to note 
the role and function of the disputants. The court gave no significance 
to the fact that the dispute was between policy makers. The plaintiffs 
are councilmen, legislators for the City of Legan. The dispute was 
between them, the two of us, and the mayor in his policy-making role. 
The dispute that provoked conflicting legal opinions and ultimately lead 
to this suit was a proposed ordinance that was vetoed and failed in 
an attempted override. See Section 1-6-6 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City attached hereto (marked as Defendant's Exhibits "B" and "C"). 
To claim that this dispute was "judicial" is to ignore the role of a 
legislator and the conditions necessary for a response to that role. The 
conditions for legislation must be such that the legislator may be 
cieli berate and free to make choices between alternative possibilities. 
-9-
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Legal or judicial interference renders this c:i1scretionary activity 
meaningless and representative government becomes a hollow activity, 
The role is a creative one to discover solutions to social conflicts 
and problems. To identify a dispute between legislators in the 
course of the legislative process on a policy question as "legally 
ripe for judicial determination" is to make legislators accountable to 
the judge for their policy decisions. Legal accountability means that 
legislators may be sued in court for their decisions, i.e. , if the court 
listens to them as plaintiffs, how can it not as defendants. For the 
legislative function to be significantly useful, the discretionary featur' 
must be protected; the legislators must be accountable primarily to 
their voter constituency. The legislators cannot be both politically 
accountable and judicially subcrdinated during the process of the 
legislcitive activities. The election pro vi des for political accountabih: 
1he legal or judicial process makes for legal accountability. The 
judge, by accepting into his court t.his suit from these city legislators, 
failed to note the difference be tweer; the two responses. The separc:tic 
of powc~rs doctrine recognizes the elen>er;t of accountability in assigni: 
functions to sepurate, equal branches of government. It is a crucial 
element in Logan City's peculiar form of government. The differences 
in assigned functions are to be ncted betv1een the office of the mayor 
and the council. ooth cire politically responsible by elections of the 
citizens. The rr<"tyor, however, is additionally legally accountable 
for the perforrnci1cce of his administrative assignment. 
Legislators take the same oath of office as do the jurists. They 
beth swear to uphold federal and state constitutions and the Jaw. Bot 
must be free to make decisions in their areas of assignment. If either 
is interrupted ill its processes, their effectiveness is diminished. 
- l 0--
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POI1'T V. 
INTIRHRENCI: WITH THE CITY'S PROCESSES 
Having refused to note the significance of permitting legislators 
to be litig<rnts on policy issues, the court, with impunity, invaded the 
legal entity of the city. The city has a jurisdictional area of authority and 
a procedure to determine policies and enforce them. Not only is it 
essential that legislators be free from unwarranted judicial interference, 
it is equally important that the city in its legislative functions be 
independent and maintain its initial responsibility over its jurisdiction. 
The court has failed to respect the integrity of the city and recognize 
its independence. For the court to claim that the disputes are 
"ripe for judicial determination" is not only to misunderstand the role 
and the identity of the disputants, but it also ignores that the issues being 
disputed are policy-making ones. Here it should be noted that although 
defendant's counsel has stipulated with plaintiffs that the "issues" raised 
are justiciable, those parties should not be allowed to confer jurisdiction 
upon the court where none in reality exists. Most of the issues had not 
been discussed by the council, and all of them, unless the court 
directs the voting of the council, must yet be determined by the legislative 
process. 
The court chose to pronounce an ordinance (dated September 16, 1976), 
which was not raised as an issue in the Complaint, as being inadequate. 
It cl so chose to interpret financial procedures, tr an sf er of funds, which 
cc '-'ld have been and still must be accorr:plished by ordinance. The 
external auditors and the state auditor are responsible to interpret fiscal 
procedures. The plaintiffs took the fiscal issue as a complaint to the 
c0urt rather than to the council. It had not been discussed in the council. 
There is even a question as to whether there would have been a dispute 
in the council. If there was a legitimate one and the judge took it 
-11-
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seriously, he could have invited the auditors, state or external, who 
are initially responsible, to explain the prcctice and the Jaw. 
The real property transaction complaint of the suit was stated 
deceptively. It was stated as though someone, we or the mayor, 
supposed that the mayor could, without authorization, buy, sell, or 
lease real estate. ·we have insisted from the beginning that the mayor 
only performed those functions that were legally authorized, adopted 
by an ordinance, resolution, or appropriation. We did not contend 
that the mayor has inherent power. We insist that all of his 
activities be legally authorized. What we oppose is the involvement 
of the council in final or administrative action. We disagree that 
a transaction authorized by ordinance, appropriation, or policy 
directive needed a second or final council involvement. Final participat. 
in a property transaction is no different from the final act of buying a 
car, a typewriter or a basketball. The judge's declaration about the 
inadequacy of an existing ordinc;ice was cbout the council's involvement 
in the latter kind of transaction a'.1d was adopted not because we agreed 
we needed it, but as a compromise measure among the different position: 
of councilmen. But regardless of the degree of involvement of the counc:: 
such activities are the prerogative of the city's "governing body" to 
be stoted in ordinances. The judge's ar:ceptance of this complaint not 
only distorts the procedure, il shows his failure to inquire about and 
to understand the ncture of the dispute. The remedy or decree of the 
court b a presumpti"ve intervention. 
The court ordGr that only the council can approve of innerblock and 
planned unit developments is evidence of the court's misunderstanding 
of the separation of powers system. Basic to the theory of the system 
is that skilled administrators execute a policy made by the council 
with far more equity and efficiency than an untrained council. The 
judge of the court in declaring the ordinc:nce that assigns this function 
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to administration as being illegal, had no basis, legal or otherwise, 
for his declaration and interference. This was within the prerogative 
and judgment of elected officials. The claim of the judge is that approving 
these units is similar to approving subdivisions, therefore, is governed 
by that state statute. He does not say, however, why a decision 
about it cannot be made by the council. The writers of the state statute 
did not anticipate the Optional Forms Act or clusters or planned 
unit developments. Is the is sue so legal as to be beyond the decision 
of the city policy makers? The court could just as well have decided 
that subdivision, as well as cluster and planned unit requirements, could 
have been complied with by an ordinance assigning the final approval 
to city administration. This would have permitted consistency and 
would have conformed to the new system's conceptual procedure 
of the "governing body". Is the risk of the ordinance being subsequently 
declared illegal in this circumstance different from those of any other 
legislative action? Certainly the concern one way or another on any 
of these matters does not have the urgency that justifies judicial intervention 
into the city's "governing body's" procedure by a Declaratory Judgment 
intervention. And if they do are there any disputes in the council and 
between council and mayor not subject to court action? \Vhat kind 
of city policy is not subject to court intervention during its formation? 
The court claims that section in the State Code, (Section 10-3-1215), 
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the council over its internal matters 
and is not, therefore, subject to the mayor's approval or rejection. But 
the court fails to define these kinds of matters--we believe that if 
there are matters exclusively the concern of the council, that they should 
be distinguished by an ordinance (with the mayor's signature). The rules 
und order of business for conducting the council's business is, no 
c'oubt, sufficiently critical to be prescribed by ordinance. 'I'nis would 
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add to citizen understanding and trust of fr_e p:ucess. Following a 
legally prescribed procedure may avoid the c:ppearance of arbitrary, 
whimsical action. But this, too, is the cou:-:cil's business. 
We also believe that an action involv1:-.g expending money for 
whatever purpose, this lawsuit included, is the city's business and 
is subject to the ordinance-making proced1C.re for both its appropriatwn 
and expenditure. 
The court, in disagreeing with this belief, seemed to imply the 
method of seeking legal coun se 1 we: s some!-iow beyond the determinc:tion 
of the procedure of the "governing body." Is deciding if the municipal 
council needs legal counsel different from other issues decided by the 
council? Is it different because the judge believes that councilmen have 
an inherent right to counsel which the court must insure? If so, how 
has the court guaranteed it? The judge hc.s said that three councilmen 
can decide. What happens to the rights of t::ie cinority of two or one; 
how will thPy be assured of paid-for cour,sel? D:::Jes a three member 
majority vote have less minority problems ttan four? 
In the court's Declaratory and Injunctive Ee lief, the judge completely 
invades the city. He declares that with a council-passed resolution, it 
may pay the fees from appropriated or generc.l funds, and to insure that 
it is not interferred with, he forbids the mayor to veto the council's 
efforts to pursue thR three members' position of the "gravel pit" 
transaction. By what legal principle may a veto be denied? l'u1d then 
how is this proccsf:: distinguished from the one by whieh the judge 
permits that by ordinance the councH controls finances. How informative 
and how contradictory! However, the judge :ir,ally admitted that the 
business and the method of the council is t8 pass ordinances, appropriate 
funds ••.. etc. 
Finally, the jud0e "permanently enjoir:ed the defendant or his ~ 
from interferrinq with the plaintiffs in the exercise of their duties 2s 
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determined by the Declaratory Judgement." One need not even be a 
litigant in the judge's court to be threatened with his orders! He does 
not answer, do the plaintiffs retain their rights of plaintiffs after they 
cedse to be councilmen, and/or do all succeeding councilmen become 
plaintiffs? 
POINT VI. 
THE RELIEF AND REMEDY--POLITICAL, NOT LEGAL 
Most court action concludes with directives to the defendant based 
upon the rules of law stated by the court. The only order to the defendant-
mayor is not to interfere with the plaintiffs' court-assigned claims. 
'There is only one way the defendant could interfere and that is with 
the veto. He is specifically forbidden to veto the gravel pit investigation. 
This is unnecessary since the mayor is denied participation in the newly 
created resolution. In this suit, however, most of the remedies are 
dependent upon action by the plaintiffs. The plaintiff legislators 
sought court reversal of their political defeats. The implementation of 
the remedies is by council action with the resolution. The political nature 
of the remedies is clearly evident, however, when it is noted that the 
remedies become dependent upon the agreement of the council members. 
By court decree, three council members' complaints became legal; 
by the same court decree and court-invented procedure, the three 
council members in council implement the remedies. (See Exhibits "A-D" 
attached to defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena which is a part of 
the trial court record.) For three months, they, with their new procedure 
and court support, the three council rre mbers have been doing all 
the things they wanted. 
But what happens where there is disagreement? For example, what 
happens to the "gravel pit" issue or the hiring of legal counsel and any 
other related matters if the three cease to agree? Even more critical 
to this case, what happens if to pay for this suit or some other suit, an 
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appropriation of funds from the city is necessary? Has the judge 
changed the city's procedure so that three council members can approprit 
city money as well as direct its expenditure? Or does the judge, by 
court decree, appropriate funds? What happens to the appropriation 
by ordinance requirement? 
What happens when new councilmen take office? Even if by 
succession, as directed to the defendant-mayor, they may become only 
plaintiffs, there were no council member defendants and there are 
none now. Could new council members be under court order to favor 
the policies of thP plain ti ff members ? V\'hat happens if they do not? 
Do disputes that once were "ripe for judicial determination" retain 
their''.ripeness" '? Or does it take the three council members to make 
them "ripe"? Has the court declared a legal principle that all councils 
shall retain legal counsel? Are all councils to investigate "gravel pit" 
like transactions cind rescind them if they disagree? Has the court 
provi.ded a principle aboul the city fund transfer? The procedure for 
buying, selling and leasing property 7 V\'hat if by unanimous agreement 
the "governing body" chose to implement by ordinance and with approval 
of the state auditor, different fund management practices? Will the 
court intercede? And if it does, do all elected officials become 
defendants? 
The court really has not stated principles that would be useful in 
determi11inq when disriutes brocomf' legally "ripe," or which kind, or at 
what point a council can expPct j11d1cial interference. The court 
cictually t1iJS left nothing foe the office of mayor to do differently since 
currentl)r he executes only those policies fnat were determined by the 
"governin,;i body'·. 
Clearly, the court is entirely dependent upon the political process 
of the council for implementation of its remedies. A better solution 
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may have been for the judge to join the council and become its constant 
legal and political conscience. There he could, with complete abandon, 
function in the political arena that he has chosen for himself in this 
case. The dependency on the council by the court for remedial 
implementation makes it apparent that the is sues in the suit are political, 
not legal. 
THE SUMIV'.ATION 
We are mystified as to why the court felt compelled to accept the 
case. The plaintiff council members were clearly legislators. The 
disputes were about the business before the council. The plaintiffs 
were unsuccessful by the legal procedural requirements in the municipal 
council. Had they been successful, with one more vote, there would 
have been no court suit. Or had only two of the elected officials been 
disappointed, there would have not been one. Of the many is sues stated 
in the initial suit, one is all that was actually discussed in the council 
at the time of the adoption of the resolution; the remainder were attached 
by the three council members or their attorneys but never presented for 
approval to the council. The many added ones were concoctions, which 
could have been council business, but were never legitimately before 
the council. Why the court would choose to join these legislators in 
pursuit of their policy issues is beyond our understanding. Obviously, 
the court's remedy is to join them in their council vote. Since the 
plaintiffs, once away from the court are beyond its control, they are 
free to pmsue whatever issues the three of them and their attorneys 
agwe to. It is even more mysterious how the court could justify 
tampering with the legally prescribed procedures simply to accommodate 
plaintiffs' legislative interests. 
It is difficult to understand how the court could read statutes that 
define Logan's government as being two separate, independent, and 
equr,l branches of government and the phrase, "governing body," as 
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meaning collectively legislative and executive, and then in total 
contradiction, conclude that the council 1 s tl-ie "governing body". 
It is equally difficult to understand how the court legally questions 
the state legislative language that provides a distinctive council-
mayor form of city government. All the other statutory forms give 
distinctive responsibility to councils or commissions. Is it not possible 
that the legislature intended to copy for the cities, the federal and 
state constitutional model that separates functions of government? And 
could it not have believed that with the separation feature the same 
purposes of other governmental levels be achieved at the local level? 
Is there a belief by the court that the principle of the "rule of law, " the 
legal purpose of separation of power, cannot be implemented in city 
government 7 And does the court question the need of the city for the 
political device of check and balance? Perhaps the court does not 
believe that the state legislators noted, as the founding fathers did, 
that by separating legislative from the admir.ist:ative functions, that 
they guarded against the inclination of policy r.:c.kers to change policies 
when they administer them. And that many policies could only be 
fairly administered by experts, trained to see policy purposes and 
distinctions provided in policies formulated by a separate branch. Many 
legalists believe that law.:> have a better chance of being general and 
prospective, a rule of law requirement, by the separation of powers feature 
Does the cow·t question that ci responsible uniform administration is 
best attained by a single publically responsible administrator? 
The cowl could do well to clarify its objective. It gives no hint of 
i !legality to i he 0 ptic,nal Forms l\ct yet it questions, distorts and seems 
to deny the law's obvious intent to be a unique form. The special 
political interest that provoked the Declaratory Suit seems to have 
directed the court's legal conclusions. 
The fudr;e of the first Judiciril District, rc.ther than clarifying the 
low, has confused it, ThJs may have hc.ppP.neo because he refused to 
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recognize in his decision that a form of municipal government was at 
stake. He did not permit hearings and gave no indication of how, what , 
or when he was making his decision. Most of the complaints were 
unsubstantiated; some of the charges were of no consequence and some 
were not even controverted. The judge seemed to be unconcerned 
with the truth of the complaints or the significance of his decision. 
The court leaves much in doubt about Logan City's form of government. 
The mayor, questionably involved, was mistakenly the defendant and 
appears to have lost the case. Logan with the State of Utah may have 
been a more appropriate defendant, for their form of city government 
was the issue. Rather than defining the role of the office of mayor, 
the decision leaves many unanswered questions about the office. The 
law still states that the mayor's office is a separate, independent, and 
equal branch of city government, sharing in the "governing body" 
activities. The judge says that the office is subordinate to the "governing 
body" council. The law states that the mayor is responsible to the voters 
for the administration of city policies. The court says that the mayor 
is responsible to the council for administration. The law says that the 
mayor shall participate in all policy making by signing or vetoing 
ordinances, resolutions, tax assessments, and so on. The judge says 
that he cannot veto resolutions or other actions that the council interprets 
as exclusively its business. If the intent of the court was to clarify 
the relationships of the two offices, it failed. For us, it only confuses. 
To us, the Utah State Legislature provided for the creation of two 
separate, independent and equal branches of government. It made 
the branches separate by distinguishing two functions and assigning 
one function to each branch. It made the branches i ~C::ependent by having 
the officers in each directly responsible to the electorate. It made the 
branches ~~by the checking features that each has on the other. 
The District Judge has tampered with the system. He did not declare 
it invalid, though to h:JVe done so would have made what he did more 
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understandable. Rather, he has destroyed or distorted it beyond its 
intended form. We, therefore, respectfully ask the Supreme Court of 
Utah to reverse the First District Court's decision. 
/) , 
///1 ~ - _I 
(I cf I zd~D .> d,i'ZZ«d/(~ 
Claude J. Burtenshaw, Councilman 
Logan %unic1pal Council 
~T~ 
Glenn T. Baird, Councilman 
Logan Municipal Council 
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Depa:r·.me:it ~ for Cny Go'.·e:-::m ent. 
Appointi·;,; Of:icer:::. 





C1 ty Record e!" 
City Treasurer. 
Chief of Fire D'=par:m e::t. 
Chapter 1. 







Bra:-iche s of Cny Government. 
The Executive Branch. 
The Judiciai Branch. 
The Legislative Branch. 
Municipal Cour:cii Meetings. 
Mayor--Powers a:-id Duties. 
2-1-1. Brar:ches oi City Gove:;-:ment. The City government shall 




2-1-2. The Ex.::cut'"'~ B:-a'"!cb_. Tne Executive Branch of government 
headed by the Mayor as the Chief Executive Officer is hereby divided into 
tw0 .cdministrative ievels, the upper level being designated "department" 
end the lower level being designated "division" w [thin a department. 
(a) The depa;-~ments of the admrnisuat1ve branch of government are 
dc:fignated as foiiows: 
(1) Department of Police 
(2) Depa:1m0ri1 ot Fire 
(3) IA.f:'dl':mer:t o: Rc..:;_rear1on 
13 
(4) D'-"par~m,,~,; o~ t:nvirn-.;.<.ntal Eealth and S::ilid V\faste Management 
(')) u~-l-'"~;·~~~-:r:- ... :t o~ l\drni:uc;t_rction 
(E,) Dep0:rm 0 ~,, o' Public \~·o:K.s 
(SECTIONS 2-1-1 to 2-1-6 amended 
7 /1/76) 
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(7) Depar:me:-ic o'. Pari<.s 
(8) Depar1.me;i'. o' L1b"Fl:J' 
(9) Depa:---:ment o: Power 
14 
(b) 'fne:--•-e f'hoill oe 1_-r··~ :oiiowi:lg ::!;v1sio·1s within and under the Departmer: 
of Admi:·11s:-auo:1: 
(1) Pc;rch::i;;1;--,q ~:--_6 S10:e; D1-·i sio:-i 
(2) Person:-iel D1·:i 510r. 
(3) Treasu:-2~ s DiYision 
(4) Reco:-der-Accoc;nti;-ig Division 
(c) There shaii be che ioli:Y.Ni;-ig cn·isions within and under the Departmer.: 
of Public Works: 
(1) Airpo,-: Di··1s10~. 
(2) Property a:-:c S·.a:ding Mal'agemerit Division 
(3) Gardge and Mo·,o• Pool DiviEion 
(4) Water and Sewer Divis10n 
(5) Cemetery DPision 
(6) Pianr.ir:g Di.>·ision 
(7) SL"aetE D1-.·i sion 
(8i Engireen:ig Di"''swn 
(d; The C1 ;y ,:,,:o:·:--.r,;· a·~-:J Budg·;; 1 Of:fice: o'. the city shall be staff 
advbors to the chi-J'. ,_:.:1 -"cuti ;e of:,, __ er. 
(e) Tne genf'•ai :._,:1::·1or::::, po·.v:;~.:; ar.d duties of each department 
and departmer.t head a:-r.: cs follows· 
(lJ .QSQ?.::l'.JlE''' c;" Polic.;; a00 Poli-:e C!Jief - The function of the 
Department o~ Police i~- to p:--e~8"'•'•3 i:.he peace and good order of the city, to 
detect jnd trrnu ail '.,iolc«o:F of :-ctace and city iaw to justice, to prevent crime 
and protecl li!e :inc ci·ope;:.y and 'o pc:r-'.orm 311 other functions as required by 
law, 
h is the CLl1Y ,me: iund1on of the Ci'iie1 of Police to direct and control 
the activities ot che Po]JC•' Depa-1ine,1t and to perform all other functions and 
duties as required by iav,. 
(2) .P.2R_q::_:.!_T',__~~c~)Jrc c"ld Fire Ch1e_f - The general function of the 
fire Departmsnt is lO p~;:·Jent io~ s of life and proi:erty by fire by enforcing 
:'.ire p'."ev2ntion iaw s ei:18 - egul::it.io11s, and by extinguishing fires and to perforr. 
;'Ill other function!' r-0 d·1ties a~c required by law. 
It is th'? cLi-::v o~ tic" Fire Chie'. to control and direct the activities of 
t;w Fin: D·3P.'l'-Trn·:''' c; d 'O c_e'2 to :he p-opec educction and training "Jf its 
person:1el I 1oqe1"r:c:~1 -\'•'1~:: 7_:--rt- p:·op-~· !T'IO!L l2:-1L::ir.ce of all rire Dcpertr:riEnt equipn' 
(S[C:DONS 2-1-1 to '1-1-6 ,wenrif 
-
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and to peGorm all other functions and duties as required by law. 
(3) Department of Rec;eation and its Director - The Department of 
Recreation t1as the function of assessing the current recreati::rnal needs of the 
city and of organizing and of!"ering a broad range of recreational and leisure 
time programs for the citizeris of Logc:n. In carrying out this function, it 
has the responsibility to coordinate programming efforts with other existing 
agencies or entities in the community, It shall perfonn such other functions 
required by law. 
The Director of the Recreation Department has the function and duty 
to assess, organize and supervise, the recreational and leisure time programs 
of the city and perfonn such other functions and duties required by law. 
(4) Department of Environmental Health and S'Jlid Waste Manaaement 
and its Director - The general function of the Department of Environmental 
Health and Soi.id Waste Management is to perform all functions of the city 
with respect to health and sanitation. Said department has control of the 
proper operation of the city's sewage lagoon and solid waste disposal systems. 
It shall perfonn all other functions as required by law. 
The Director of the Department of Environmental Health and Solid 
Waste Management shall direct and control the sewer lagoon system and the 
solid waste disposal activities of the city, He shall conduct inspections 
and tests where desirable or necessary. He shall perfonn all other functions 
and duties as required by law. 
(5) Departmer.r of Administration and its Director - The general 
function of the Department of Administration is to provide general administrative 
services in support of all other departments, divisions and staff officers of the 
city, and to supervise the managers of the divisions of Purchasing and Stores, 
Personnel, Treasurer, and Recorder-Accounting, and to provide the Mayor with 
infonnation regarding the activities of those divisions and to coordinate their 
functions and activities. It shall perfonn all other functions as required 
by law. 
The Director of the Department of Administration shall exercise general 
supervision over all divisions within said department. He is responsible for 
providing the Mayor with administrative infonnation regarding the general or 
overall operations of the city and perfonn any other functions or duties required 
by law. 
(6) Department of Public Works and iJs Director - The general functions 
of the DepartmeEt of Public \/\forks are to supe;vise ancJ direct the managers 
of thF DiviE1on of the Airport and the Division of Property and Building Management, 
the· )/,, 1 , ir Pool Dh·i s iun, the \•Vate:- and Sev.· et· Division, t..l-ie Cemetery Division, 
tf, "ic.nninq D1·:ision, Iii<' SLect:: Di'l.·ision, and the Engineering Division. It 
~·-:··c"·11,, all oth'=r foroc-tions as required by law. 
~')-,,) Di~Pc1or of the Department of Public \\TJrks i::upervises the managers 
of 1! .. - ato"(" r.ivis10nc: He> c;dmir,isters the cesign and construction of all public ,. 
-- (SECTIONS 2-1-1 to 2-1-6 amended 7/1/76) 
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projects by prog~amming the cooperative dfo:is of the needed departments 
and d1,·1sions of the city, He perfo::-m s ali otlie' fc;nc':wns and duties as 
required by law. 
(7) De_Qa"tment 01- Parlcs and its Director - The general function of 
the Department oi Pa~ks i- lo marntai:: and imp~ove the parks and the Wilbw 
Park Zoo, and to super;•ise :he pla:-;ting and ma1rtaining of trees and other 
plants on city proper:1es i;-icluding alongside streets, and to perfonn all 
other functions as required by law. 
The D1:-ector of the Department of Pa,~ks shall supervise, improve, 
and maintain ali cny pa::-ks. tile V\Tillow Park Zoo, and all other city property 
assigned to his care, and per:'.orm all other functions and duties required by 
law. 
(8) Depa-cmer:+ o: Lib:-ary (lnd its Board of Directo.:s. The Library 
Department shall ope:-ate, maintain and care tor the city library and perfonn 
any other functions rec;uired by law. 
The City Library Board of Directors shall supervise the operation, 
maintenance ond care oi the library including the adJpti::m of rules and 
regulations not ir,consisten• with law, for the governing of the library, shall 
appoint the city libraria;;, and perform such other functions and duties as 
required by \av; . 
(9) :Q_fil;i;j-tm~_u__t oi_Powe~_sind its Director - The general function ofthE 
Depc:rt~nent of Pmve~ is to fu:-nish adec:uate electrical energy to all 
those rieedi:-i') the same anr:l located within the city. It shall perfonn all 
other functions required by law, 
1he Dite::wr of the Depanme:-1t of Power directs and supervises 
the operation of the city; s diesel power plant, its hydroelectric plant and 
the tra::smissior: and cis:.ribut10n of all electricity within the City of Logan. H€ 
shail perform all other :unctions and duties required by law. 
(£) Th':'; Qe'ie1·al fur:ct1ons of e:a,_:1 division within and under the Departmen'. 
uf Acim1n1Slrat1on ar,d their mar.agers are as follows: 
(1) The Pu_rc:_b_Q.~j:-10 and Sto.-es Division and its I\~anaaer - The general 
functh;;i of the Divlsion of Purchasing and S<:ores is to perchase all the equiprn1 
supplies and other personal prope:i:y for the city's departments and 
divisions upo:-, the best tenns and for the best price possible. The Division 
al so accounts fo::- end co:-n:-ols the inventory of said property for the city, and 
r•erfo::-ms all other iu;1ctions as required by law. 
The Ma:iager of the Division of Purchasing and Stores acts as purcha: 
cqent for the ::1ty in sacu:_-i;-,g ali the Eupplies, equipment, and other personal 
p:cpcrty :--e1"did '•y ih<? c1•y's departments end divis1·Jns a~1d controllicg and 
:no::ito;1n~1 u-,,~ inve:1lO"V o_i Ll1e ~awe He shall pe~-orrn SUC'h '.'ther functions I' 
cutie5 requHed hv Jm·,, 
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(2) The Perso:inel Division a!"!d its Manager - The Division of Personnel 
,hall establish and implement guidelines and procedures in the city's hiring 
~rocess, promotions, discharges, etc. to insure compliance with law affecting 
and regulating employees and employment relations. It shall suggest and implement 
such practices and policies as will in sure the acquisition and rentention of 
qualified employees for the city, and perform such other functions as required 
by Jaw. 
The I\l'anager of the Personnel Division shall carry out the goals and 
functions of said Division including the proposal of wage schedules that adequately 
reflect market conditions to assure retention of qualified personnel for the 
city. He shall also supervise and assist all department directors and division 
managers in hiring city personnel, and perform all other functions and duties 
required by law. 
(3) TrE?ast:rer's Division and its Manager - The Treasurer's Division's 
functions are to take custody and account for all monies, bonds, or other 
securities belonging to the city and to perform all other functions required by 
Jaw. 
The City Treasurer shall be responsible for the proper receipt of all city 
monies, to accurately account for and take custody of the same, and perform all 
other functions and duties required by law. 
(4) Recorder-Accounting Division and its Manager -
(i) The general furr::tion of the Division of the City Recorder is to 
keep the records and papers of the city including contracts, deeds, 
ordinances and re solutions and to keep a record oi the proceedings 
and the meetings of the governing body and perform all other 
functions required by law. 
The City Recorder shall countersign all contracts made in behalf 
of the city and make a record of all contracts, properly indexed. 
He sha 11 attend the meetings of the governing body and keep a 
record of their proceedings and keep and file such other records, 
documents, etc" of the city, and perform such other functions and 
duties as required by law. 
(ii) Tne accounting functions of the Recorder-Accounting Division 
are to ini.tiate and ins tall systems and procedures including 
internal control procedures within and among the various departments 
and divisions of the city, to keep or cause to be kept the General 
Ledger and General Journals for all city funds, prepare payroll and 
payroll reports, and to conduct the billing cperations of the city, 
and to perform all other functionE required by law. 
(1ii) Th::: clau processing furcti:J;-,s of the Recorder-Accounting Division 
lS 'c µrc''"ide cc;r;,pute1- Ec.-vicc: ~i.pport to city operations, and to 
µe;-iorm any other functions required by law. 
(S[CTiONS 2-1-1 to 2-1-6 amended 7/1/16) 
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'-'!_ (g) The general !u'lc1ior'S of each d1v15ion wichin and under the Department 
o(Pub!ic 'vVorks a:-id 1:v;;1r ma:-.agers ?.re as foilo-,>5. 
(1) Aj_rQo::-;: DL'15ion __ a_I,i__Lt':.Jl_f,3•,cger - (A) The Ai;port Division shall prov 
adequate ai;-5erv1ce '.aciii:12~ for t'.1e cny a:1d i1s occupants arid perform all · 
other functions as required by law. 
(B) The Mar.ager of , ... ,e Airpon Di•.·i~ion ohail manage the airport facilities 
and maintain the same and perfo~m ail ocher :ur.c:ion.s ar.d duties required by law, 
(C) The County of Cache is hereby designated as the manager of the 
city's interest in the airport a:;d is he;e!:Jy delegated ali of the rights, responsibik 
and duties in connection he:-p·.ivith. If '!:he Mayor deems appropriate, he is 
hereby authorized to prepare and negotiate, a contract with the County of Cache, 
setting forth in greater detail, the managemem duties of Cache County and 
formalizing the relation.> hi? ::' 0 ' ··eP:-i :he :::ounty a~.d the City of Logan with respect 
to said airport .fac~ii'c1es. Tn:-o ··~oi..:ocy i:: s~so he:eoy authorized to e:-iforce any 
and an agree me··:~' :JE;t·.ves:-. ·'1e cou~ ·y the city :ind third parties with respect to 
use of airpo:i fo:::ilnies, 
(2) l'.rnJ1.en:::-:._2;:;.d __ !)_u1j_~iri::1..Ma_~~.ag_?_~:r:,;:,n~ _ _l2Ll?L91l and its Manager -
The general ~· ... nctio'1 o. t:1"' P:opcr'.f a"._j Buiiding Management Division is to 
maintain, ~~p:iir 1 Lnp !""Cr·", a:-; . o·. c.c-::oee rn.:.. lr;a=ing o: managing of any city 
propc.-.H s :-iot di IE:::; y did ;:,..,; - j ;),' :; ·,o+ r,"-: di· ris iO'.' or d·-:Opartment of the city and 
to perform .Olt OT."18r .:,nc:.0;1 · re.:_,11~,;d oy ~a·N. 
Th2 M=- ~a::wr o~ t"'l~ P:o0Grv· a·,r, 3u1i di•,g Ma:·.agement Division shall 
Sllpen·ise t:1e ma:,-;e: i1·1:0:-, r'-)Jsj- a•1c ;;r,:::i:o .c;rnen~ o:' city properties, and to 
mc:-iage other ci;y p··oo"'-'-.1· _, a:10 1e i"l<'~Crit•ed and per:::orm any other duties or 
functions reqw.ireci ty !aN. 
(3) g_~@S'!.'."._.: _!':1~9.'~ f.9.9·:o__=_)J..)_;:jg~: __ 'i_'liJ.IL_Man6qP.r - The general functions 
of ihe Garage and Mo LOf Pool D1·.:\sw:1 c:t 10 r.iaintain and repair ail motor 
vehicles and similar equipmer:i_ owr:ed :::Jy ",he city 0 It shall supervise and 
co0rdinate the use of city mo 1.or 'rehic!E-s among c:nd within the vc:rious depart-
ments and divisions to faci~1:at.e a more ef:icient and economical use of said 
vehicles and perform a:1y other function5 provided by law. 
ThE Manager of the Garage and Motor Pool Division shall supervise, 
control ar.d manage the mcir.te;10nce ar.r:l repair of tbe city's motor vehicles and 
sir.1ilar equipment a:-id super.·i.>e and coor::hnare the use of said vehicles among 
the ciepa rtments and di·.ri s ior,: of the city. He shall perform all other functions ar 
duties required by law, 
(4) \!\'al§I__a_o_c)__~s_we• P.i\1i~"_ion and_Lts Mcn_ager - The general functions 
of the ·water and Sewer Div; sio'I are to provide all persons and entities within 
the city with ar: adeq •..:ate w<:Her ~ ,1 pp~ y cs well a~ effective sewer and dr cinage 
service, end to per'orm such other fur;c~ions required by law. 
Thf:" j\ffan.r,qe of the ·,.\~5t_er d""it: s~:'-•JP,[ D1\1 ision =up':!\.'1S---:s, 6.S~igns and 
scheciulP5 C'-"-'·S for t'riro pu~p:)-;e o: in:0 7alling, raintarnir.c;, :~:rairing or 
(SECTJCH ::-l-2(g)(i) cn1'.?'lcied 4/7/77) 
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inspection of any part of the city's water a;-id sewer system, He shall perform 
all other functions and duties required by law. 
(5) Cemetery Division 'lnd its Manager - The general functions of 
the Cemetery Divisio!-i is to provide the public with an adequate cemetery, 
properly managed and maintained, and to perform all other functions required by 
)aw. 
The Manager of the Cemetery Division shall see to the proper division 
and organization of the cemetery into lots and spaces, sell lots, collect fees, 
(SECTION 2-l-2(g){l) amended 4/7/77) 
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manage and fup2rr1:;e bun<:>l.5 anri pi-o'..·emen: 0£ heac!swr1es and supervise burials 
and placern,:;;-,t. o': head5:o:ies a:-irJ supien·1se lhe p~opt!.c care and maintenance 
of the ceme1eryo He' shall pe:-'.:orm all oth'°'- L.cicuons and duties required by law, 
(6) .!J.9~ring_D.c:uj:,>r1_~l'."l_i',..5 J\ia:0 ag'"r: - The general funstions of the Cr 
Planning Division a'.·c co act .~:o processional stcd and advisor to the City 
Planning Comrn1ss10n anC:: sll oc.her city departments c.nd divisions needing 
such planning secvice or a-:J\·1c e. Said di vis wn al so evaluates all pending 
building permi!s a:-,d desig:-:;o and evaiua1es city-initiated projects needing 
planning service or advice o It shail perform all other. furictions required by law, 
The Mar.age:- o:f -:.he Planning Division, or City Planner, shall assist otbt 
departments and divisior.s in evaluati:-1g all pending building permit applications:: 
assure the proposed project's complicince with current land use ordinances. He 
shall assist the public in obtaining and uc-1derstanding the city's land use and 
zoning ordinances, and guide fo; development. He shall supervise the 
perfonnance of all other functions and dutief' o: his division and any other functic· 
or duties required by law, 
(7) _Street;: Di·.J.c~i_Q.oL<L'l~l_i_ts Mq__nager::_ - The general functions of the 
Division of St:-eet.s arP to S'2e to the proper construction, maintenance, and repair 
the c::y streets, sidewalks <::Llrbs, gutters and other fixtures under the city's 
control and lo·::ated upoll :he cny·s highways, roadways or rights of way. It 
shall perform all othet· :'unctions reguired by law, 
The Manaq S!" of the Division o" Street 2 shall supervise the activities 
and schedulinq o'.: work in ire di\·ision and assure the proper operation and 
mcEntenance of all e:i-uipment within said division. He shall review all work 
done by anyone on t'"ie ci'!:y ootr2e:s to assure its compliance with applicable standr 
He o.hall perform all othe:- :'·Ll:-ic:tions and duties required by law. 
(8) _I._'1_~-f~'..2.!'.~~~~29_f)t·isi_OIJ.-.S.:C:d its Manager - The general functionsoi 
En<;!ineering Divis10;\ a".'e :o provide n·~cessary engineering se•vices to all other 
department:; and di1.-1"ions of the city, to act as ci.:rtodian of records of public 
ir1,1xovemen:s (Hlen·.i!:i;tng the detail of thei: construction and location), maps, pk 
plats, pro~iie~', dnwir-,ys, estimates, ar,d specifications which any way relate to 
the p11blic 1::ip:o·;erne:1ts 3,1:: e:igii>eering afhirs of the city. The Engineering Divi~ 
shall he.ve c:eneral supe,vi510n of all r::onstruction wofk to see that it cor;Jonns to 
dty plans c:~:d to f"lS•"'ifica' 10r:s. inc.Juding the superdsion of the building inspection 
functions of the city. It Eha ti perform ail other functions required by law. 
The City E!1gi:>eer o.'. M:inager. o' the Engineering Division shall exercise 
general cont.col and supervision over the fu:i::tions of the Engineering Division. 
He shall al so aci: <4S the city· r t:-a:':fic en<]rncer and perform all other functions and 
duites requ1~ed by iaw. 
(1) C~_;-.~~J~l~Q.~-~,:.;.y - I'"n'~' (:jty AP.o~_'ley E}~a11 <:;i,re thf: c1t~l government, 
inClUCl~~g i 7 5 di:ccc.tor~ .:md mc.'1aqf'':S, \E-r; 0 ] COUn5e1 ar,rJ ,,dvirp d12aJing With 
(SL('T]Q~IS 2-1-1 to 2-l-6 z':i•enci?d :·/1/lb) 
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the business of the city. He shall draft all ordinances, resolutions and contracts 
when called upon to do so and shall represent the city in all legal actions 
wherein the city is a party. He shall perform all other functions required by law. 
(2) City Budget Officer - The City Budget Officer shall perfonn such 
functions and duties as are necessary to as sure the city's compliance with the Utah 
Uniform Municipal Fisc9l Procedur-es Act (U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 10-10-23 and 
sections following). He shall perfonn such other functions and duties as required 
by law. 
2-1-3. The Judicial Branch. The Judicial Branch shall consist of the City 
Judge, his clerks and staff. 
rcr J 
2-1-4. The Legislative Branch. '!'he Legislative Branch shall consist of the 
Municipal Council with staff assistance to be furnished by the Executive Branch 
through the chief executive officer. 
2-1-5. Municipal Council Meetings. (a) The Municipal Council shall hold 
its regular meetings two (2) times each month as follows: 
On the first and third Thursdays of each month at 5:00 o'clock 
P. M. at Logan City Offices. 
(b) Special meetings of the Council may be ordered by the Chairman, a 
majority of the Council, or by the Mayor. The order must be filed with the Recorder 
and must be signed by the person or persons calling the special meeting and 
must !:·t: entered in the minutes of the Council. Except in case of emergency, 
as decicred by the Mayor, not less than two days notice of any special meeting 
must be given by the Recorder to each member not joining in the order, the 
notice of the meeting to be served personally or left at his usual place of abode. 
All regular meetings of the Council, to which any person not a principal officer 
is admitted, must be opened to the public. 
2-1-6. Mayor--Powers and Duties. (a) The Mayor being the chief 
cdministrative officer of the m~nicipality shall have such powers and duties as 
specified by the 0 ptional Forms of Municipal Government Act as it may be 
amenccd from time to time and such other dut1es as may be required by law not 
mconsistent with said Act. 
(b) The Mayor shall furnish the Municipal Council with a monthly report 
settinc; :orth the amounts of all budget appropriations, the total disbursements to 
date from those appropriations, and the amount of indebtedness incurred or 
cur:tracted against each appropriation, and the perce!1tage of the appropriations 
iric .. '71!'e:-ed to date. Said monthly report shall be due to the Council from the 
Mayor on the third Thursday of each month for the prior month's expenditures 
e.r,d re\'eiues in accordance with Section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated. 
(r:) 111e Tllfayor shall also :oubmit to the Municipal Council at the end of 
i·.cJ, cu,,;t . " ~;ucemc..nt of income anc expencitures of each utility fund 
(SECTIONS 2-1-1 to 2-1-6 amended 7/1/76) 
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reflecting their operation to the date of said statement for the current year 
ar,d comparing said period with operating results for the same period during: 
preceding year. This statement of income shall be due from the Mayor to the 
Municip:il Council on the third Thursday of the month following the end oftne 
preceding quarter in accordance with Section 10-10-70, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. . 
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